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I. INTRODUCTION
Physician peer review committees have existed for at least ten years,
but they have not been completely effective in policing their physician
colleagues.' Physician peer review committees are committees within
hospitals that are responsible for the discipline of physicians who abuse
their staff privileges, disregard hospital bylaws, or engage in conduct
which could potentially endanger the welfare of patients. The members
of these committees are physicians who themselves have privileges within
the hospital and, in most cases, serve on a voluntary basis. The ultimate
goal of the committee is to monitor all physicians and ensure high qual-
ity health care. If the committee finds that a physician's acts are egre-
gious, the committee has the authority to withdraw the physician's staff
privileges. Without staff privileges, the physician no longer has permis-
sion to use the hospital's facilities. The committee also has an obligation
to report its actions to the state licensing board which may decide, if
warranted, to revoke the physician's license. Without a license, the phy-
sician can no longer practice medicine in that state.
The peer review process seeks to prevent the substandard activity
which often leads patients who have suffered an injury at the hands of
their physician to file suit. Physician peer review committees can be a
powerful tool in identifying the incompetent physician and need to be
utilized to that end. Through the preventive actions of these committees,
the potential for litigation is markedly reduced. This Note will include in
its discussion the Oregon case that threatened the future of peer review,
the federal legislation that provides peer review committees with immu-
nity, and actions taken on the state level to protect physicians who serve
on peer review committees.
II. PATRICK v. BURGET
In December 1984, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, Dr.
Timothy Patrick in his suit against the members of an Oregon peer re-
I. For a history of peer review, see Haines, Hospital Peer Review Systems: An Over-
view, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 4, 30 (1984-85); Comment, The Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115,
1116-18 (1988); Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry,
52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 554-65 (1979).
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view committee for violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.2 The court held that the defendant physicians had illegally
conspired to restrict Dr. Patrick's opportunity to practice. The Oregon
jury awarded him $650,000 in damages, which, under antitrust law was
trebled to $1.95 million. In addition, he received $20,000 in compensa-
tory damages, $90,000 in punitive damages, and $228,600 in attorney's
fees. The total award reached $2.3 million.'
The history of this case dates back to 1972, when Dr. Patrick, a gen-
eral surgeon, went to Astoria, Oregon, a small city of 10,000 people, to
join the Astoria Clinic. Physicians in the area, including those at the
Clinic, had privileges at Columbia Memorial Hospital, Astoria's only
hospital. After completing a one year probationary term, Dr. Patrick was
offered the opportunity to become a partner at the Clinic. Displeased
with his income, Dr. Patrick refused the offer and started his own clinic
in Astoria."
In the ten years that followed, Dr. Patrick received no surgical refer-
rals from the Clinic, despite being the only surgeon at the local hospital.
The physicians from Astoria Clinic would refer patients to hospitals fifty
miles away rather than to Dr. Patrick. When he did treat patients from
the Astoria Clinic, he was accused by the Clinic doctors of stealing their
patients. The doctors at the Clinic refused to give their medical opinion
concerning Dr. Patrick's patients, yet, at the same time, criticized him
for failure to get outside consultations.'
In 1981, the Columbia Memorial Hospital staff peer review committee
began the process of terminating Dr. Patrick's privileges at the urging of
2. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986). The Sherman Antitrust Act is
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. The jury in Patrick found that Sections 1 and 2 had been
violated which read as follows:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspir-
acy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not c.xceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
3. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1505.
4. Id. at 1502.
5. Id.
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Dr. Harris, an Astoria Clinic physician. The committee voted to with-
draw Dr. Patrick's privileges because they felt that his care of patients
had been substandard.6 Patrick presented a defense at his hearing, but
the audience of physicians seemed disinterested in what he had to say.
Sensing unfair bias against him by the committee, Dr. Patrick volunta-
rily resigned before the hospital reached its decision.7 A neighboring hos-
pital immediately welcomed him and gave him hospital privileges.
Subsequently, Dr. Patrick filed suit against the doctors of the Astoria
Clinic for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.8
The jury found that the termination of Patrick's privileges by the Co-
lumbia Memorial Hospital violated the antitrust act and awarded the
aforementioned damages.'
The result of this case stunned physicians, hospitals, and their peer
review committees. 10 Could it be that by participating in the evaluation
of their fellow physicians, to rid the profession of the few who engaged in
malpractice, members of peer review committees were potentially liable
in a federal antitrust suit?
III. THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986
The Patrick case was the impetus behind Representative Ron Wyden's
drafting of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act [hereinafter
HCQIA or the "Act"] which became part of an omnibus health bill
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Reagan on Novem-
6. The committee's decision to revoke Dr. Patrick's privileges was based on 21 cases.
Some of those cases were handled by a physician other than Dr. Patrick, but were used in
his evaluation for some unexplained reason.
7. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1504. The chairman of the committee that heard
the case was Dr. Boelling, an Astoria Clinic physician who had presented charges against
Dr. Patrick to the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners two years earlier.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1505.
10. General counsel for the American Medical Association (AMA), Kirk Johnson, indi-
cated that the AMA was in disagreement with the outcome of Patrick and thought that it
"could have a chilling effect on peer review." Holthaus, The Patrick Case: Will It Hinder
Peer Review?, 1988 Hosp. 56, 56. The director of medical/legal affairs for the Oregon
Medical Association, Paul R. Frisch, stated that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in Pat-
rick v. Burget left peer reviewers with a tremendous sense of discouragement." 13 Hosp.
PEER REv. 93 (1988). "The trial court decision in the case Patrick v. Burget, was widely
cited in medical society journals and caused near panic in the medical community since it
assessed damages against peer review board members for violation of the Sherman Act as
well as for state law claims." Braveman & Kough, Peer Review Liability: Guidelines for
Advising Physician Clients, I I L.A. LAw. 43, 43-44 (1988).
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ber 14, 1986.11 Wyden sees the HCQIA as "the first step toward a na-
tional malpractice strategy."' 2 The purpose of the Act is twofold: first, it
encourages good faith peer review by physicians serving on hospital re-
view committees; and second, it creates a national practitioner data bank
that will receive reports from the state medical boards regarding medical
malpractice suits and revocation of clinical privileges.'"
It is hoped that Representative Wyden's legislation 'will help amelio-
rate the medical malpractice crisis by facilitating open and honest peer
review.14 The various methods used previously by the states have been
unsuccessful, prompting the Committee on Energy and Commerce to vo-
calize its concern that the self-regulation of the medical profession is not
as effective as is necessary to rid the field of inept doctors."
Much of the blame for the inadequacy of the system must fall upon
the hospitals.16 It is customary hospital practice to allow those physicians
who are negligent, or fail to meet the hospital bylaws, to voluntarily re-
sign with a clean record rather than to dismiss them with bad marks.
With this veil of secrecy, incompetent physicians are able to begin prac-
tice in another state free from any adverse consequences or damage to
their reputation.' 7 Of the 450,000 practicing physicians in the United
States, three to five percent, or 18,000 doctors, are not competent in
their current status as practitioners administering treatment to trusting
patients. 8
With this prevalence of incompetency, one would expect that competi-
tion and pressure from others in the profession would force the impaired
physician out of business. But evidence proves that this is not the case.
II. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3794 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152) (amended by the Public Health Ser-
vice Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-177, 101 Stat. 986 (1986)).
12. 141 CONG. REc. H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
13. H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6384.
14. In order to remedy the recent surge in medical malpractice claims, new systems are
needed to "encourage these doctors to bring cases of incompetence to disciplinary authori-
ties." Rep. Wyden in support of his Bill, 141 CONG. REc. H9963 (1986).
15. See supra note 13, at 6385.
16. In the past, the malpracticing physician has rarely had his license revoked by the
state medical board because it was seldom aware of any disciplinary actions taken by the
hospitals. Most states mandate that hospitals and physicians report actions of incompetence
(and thus discipline) to the state medical board, yet few have done so. See Bierig &
Portman, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 977,
980-81 (1988).
17. See supra note 13, at 6385. There are numerous reports to show that physicians do
move from state to state. See Comment, Physician, Heal Thyself: Because the Cure, the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U.L.
REV. 1073, 1074 n.ll (1988).
18. 141 CONG. REC. H9964 (1986).
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Why would a seemingly reputable and distinguished profession such as
medicine permit inept individuals to continue practicing unchallenged?
For an answer to this question, one must consider what is at stake for the
physician who suspects a peer is not meeting the profession's standards
and reports this malfeasance to the peer evaluation committee. If the
committee takes disciplinary action but the suspicion is unfounded, then
the accused peer can retaliate in an antitrust suit against the members of
the committee potentially resulting in substantial money damages. That
this is possible is demonstrated by the Patrick case. There is no incentive
for a physician to serve on a peer review board when the risks of liability
are so great.29 With the passage of the HCQIA, hospitals, through their
peer review boards, can take steps to eliminate malpracticing physicians
without incurring risk of antitrust liability.
Subchapter I of the HCQIA contains its protective provisions and pro-
vides immunity to physicians and dentists who serve on professional re-
view committees associated with hospitals and other health care entities
that follow a "formal peer review process for the purpose of furthering
quality health care."20 Physicians and dentists are granted immunity
from suits for damages under either federal (i.e. antitrust) or state law.21
Immunity is also extended to state licensing boards. There is a limit to
the immunity, however, as it does not apply to actions under the Civil
Rights Acts or to those actions brought by state attorneys general. 22
In order to receive the Act's protection, professional review boards
must take action "in the reasonable belief that the action was in further-
ance of quality health care" and after a reasonable effort to obtain the
19. "Doctors participating in peer review face the tremendous risk these days that they
will be sued for their actions against a colleague." Rep. Wyden in support of his Bill, 141
CONG. REC. H9963 (1986). Twenty-one percent of the physicians who have recently partic-
ipated in peer review have experienced a decreased number of referrals and even ridicule
from their peers. Comment, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will
Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (1988)(citing
survey discussed in Owens, Peer Review: Is Testifying Worth the Hassle?, MED. ECON.,
Aug. 20, 1984, at 168).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1987). The Act specifies health maintenance
organizations and group medical practices as examples. Immunity is not available in those
actions against health care practitioners other than physicians and dentists because "this
area presented the greatest potential for abuse of the professional review process for eco-
nomic or other reasons under the guise of improving the quality of health care." Hackney,
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (16) (published by the American Bar
Association in conjunction with its Forum on Health Law entitled Medical Staff and Hos-
pitals: That Delicate Relationship) (October 5-6, 1989)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6404 (Sept.
26, 1986)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1 llII(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Actions sounding in equity, such as ac-
tions for declaratory judgment or reinstatement, are not barred by this provision.
22. Id.
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facts.23 There is no immunity for actions that are based on something
other than the physician's competence or professional conduct. Examples
include: physician's membership (or lack thereof) in a professional or-
ganization, physician's fees or advertising, physician's involvement with
prepaid group health plans, and participation in a particular class of
health care practitioner.24
The HCQIA enumerates a number of procedures that boards must
follow before the due process requirement is met. First, the review board
must give the physician undergoing peer review notice of the proposed
disciplinary action, the reasons supporting it, and at least thirty days to
request a hearing. If the physician requests a hearing, the reviewing
body must then give the physician notice of the time, place, and date of
the hearing, provided that it is no less than thirty days from the date of
notice. The reviewing body must also supply a list of witnesses expected
to testify.2 6
The board must hold the hearing, if one is requested, before an arbi-
trator who is mutually acceptable to both the physician and the health
care entity, or before a hearing officer or panel of individuals who are
appointed by the entity and who are not in direct economic competition
with the physician involved.27 This right to a hearing may be forfeited if
the physician does not appear.28
At the hearing, the physician has the right to an attorney; to have a
record of the proceedings; to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses;
to present evidence; and to submit a written statement at the close of the
hearing.29 Once the board has completed the hearing, the physician in-
volved has the right to receive the written recommendation of the hear-
ing officer, along with the basis for the recommendation, and to receive a
written decision from the health care entity. It is important to note that
a professional review body's failure to meet the conditions above does not
necessarily mean that there were not adequate procedures.3" There is an
implication that if a health care entity follows its own bylaws or the
statutory provisions of the state which are similar to those of the Act, it
will have met the due process requirement.3'
23. Id. at § 11112(a)(1).
24. Id. at § 11151(9).
25. Id. at § 11112(b)(1).
26. Id. at § 11112(b)(2).
27. Id. at § 11112(b)(3)(A).
28. Id. at § 11112(b)(3)(B).
29. Id. at § 11112(b)(3)(C).
30. Id. at § 11112(b)(3)(D).
31. Rothschild, Major Omnibus Health Package Becomes Law, HEALTH L. VIGIL, Dec.
19, 1986, at 4.
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Subchapter II of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to create a national data bank which will collect infor-
mation from health care providers and insurance companies via the state
medical boards.3 2 The purpose is to prevent the physician who has had
privileges revoked in one hospital from relocating to a 'other state and
obtaining staff privileges in a hospital that is unaware of x.r! prior disci-
plinary action. When a health care entity initiates a profess:.nal review
action that results in the suspension or revocation of the physician's staff
privileges for thirty days or more, or when a physician surrenders his
privileges, the entity must report this information to the state board of
medical examiners.33 The board is then required to report this informa-
tion, as well as the names of physicians whose licenses they have re-
voked, suspended, or restricted, and a description of the reasons for such
actions, to the national practitioner data bank."' Failure of a health care
entity to convey this information to the state medical board results in
loss of the immunity given under the HCQIA for three years. 35 Failure
of the state medical board to convey this information to the data bank
will result in the Secretary's designation of another qualified entity to do
the reporting.36
Insurance companies are also a part of the data bank and must report
payments or partial payments on a policy in settlement of a malpractice
action to both the medical board of examiners and to the data bank.37
These insurers must report any payment, regardless of the amount.38
Beyond the obligation of health care providers to make reports to the
data bank, they also have a duty to request information from the data
bank on any potential new health care employee. 3 They also are obliged
to make a biannual request of the status of all members of their health
care staff.' No reporting is required until the data bank is operating,
which is hoped to be sometime in mid-1990."I
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131, 11134 (Supp. V 1987).
33. Id. at § 11133(a)(1).
34. Id. at § 11132(a).
35. Id. at § 11133(c).
36. Id. at § II132(b).
37. Id. at § 11131(a).
38. See supra note 32, at 5.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 11 135(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
40. Id. at § 11135(a)(2).
41. HHS Preparing to Implement Federal Medical Malpractice Data Bank Despite
Lack of Funding, THE BLUE SHEr, April 1988, at 8.
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IV. THE RETURN OF PATRICK V. BURGET
Following the jury's tremendous award to Dr. Timothy Patrick, the
Astoria Clinic and Drs. Boelling, Russell, and Harris appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On September 30, 1986,
the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower court, stating that
professional peer review which is conducted pursuant to state law is ex-
empt from federal antitrust actions because this peer review is deemed to
be "state action. 4 2
Patrick petitioned for writ of certiorari and argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit misapplied the doctrine of state action.43 The issue he appealed to
the Supreme Court was whether the peer review was conducted in "bad
faith," and if so, whether the state action doctrine becomes inapplicable
in that situation. 4 The American Hospital Association (AHA) filed an
amicus curiae brief jointly with the American Medical Association
(AMA), the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organi-
zations (JCAHO), the Oregon Association of Hospitals, and the Oregon
Medical Association.45 The amici agreed with the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and stressed the fact that protected peer review
is necessary to improve the quality of health care. In the brief, they cited
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, which had been enacted just
two months earlier, and requested that the Court not grant certiorari in
the Patrick case, but wait until the HCQIA is in effect to make a ruling
in a peer review antitrust case."6 The Act is not retroactive, thus the
doctors from the Astoria Clinic could not use it as a defense in the Pat-
rick case.41
42. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986).
43. Rothschild, AHA Files Amicus to Supreme Court in Patrick, HEALTH L. VIGIL,
Feb. 27, 1987, at 1.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at I. The AMA was formally organized in 1847 in order to promote the art and
science of medicine. RAKICH, LONGEST, DARR, MANAGING HEALTH SERVICES ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1985). One of the ways the AMA furthers its goals is through its political action
committees which are "instrumental in having legislation enacted that preserves the integ-
rity of health care." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HOW THE AMA WORKS FOR YOU
(1988). The JCAHO is a nonprofit corporation which gives accreditation to those health
care organizations that meet their standards for quality. Thirty-eight states (as of 1983),
the Medicare program, and some Blue Cross plans rely on JCAHO accreditation. B. FUR-
ROW. S. JOHNSON. T. JOST. R. SCHWARTZ. HEALTH LAW 345 (1987).
46. See supra note 43, at 2.
47. 42 U.S.C. § Illll(c)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1987).
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Despite the amici brief, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 48 and
on May 16, 1988, unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit decision.4 9
The Court found that in order for there to be protection of private par-
ties under the "state action" antitrust doctrine, as the Ninth Circuit in-
dicated, the "anticompetitive conduct 'must be actively supervised' by
the State itself."50 There is no active supervision of professional peer re-
view in Oregon, as the state provides neither administrative nor judicial
review with the ability to modify a review body's decision. 51 The implica-
tion of the Court's ruling is that immunity from federal antitrust suits
for health care professionals and others involved in the peer review pro-
cess did not exist before the HCQIA. 2
V. THE EFFECT OF THE ACT
A. The Immunity Provisions
Some experts in medical circles have argued that the federal immunity
from antitrust actions provided by the Act is not worth the procedures
required to receive it. Patrick is the only case where a court has imposed
antitrust liability upon physicians involved in the review of another phy-
sician's abilities.5 3 Physicians have filed hundreds of antitrust suits after
losing their clinical privileges or licenses, but have won none of them.5
The result seen in Patrick, they claim, is unique due to the particularly
egregious facts which make it obvious that the review was conducted in a
malicious attempt to drive Dr. Patrick out of Astoria, Oregon. 55
However, with the Supreme Court setting this precedent, antitrust lia-
bility for peer review board members certainly could have recurred. 56
48. Patrick v. Burget, 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
49. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988), reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 2921, on remand,
852 F.2d 1241 (1988).
50. Id. at 100 (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)).
51. Christensen & Ellingsen, Supreme Court Decides Patrick; Peer Review Alive and
Well Despite Ruling, HEALTH L. VIGIL, June 17, 1988, at 1.
52. Id.
53. Bierig, Peer Review After Patrick, 21 Hosp. LAW 135 (1988).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Positive effects of the Act are already beginning to be seen. A federal district court
in California recently granted summary judgment for a hospital and its physicians who
were active in the peer review process of one of their colleagues, Dr. Austin. The court
found that the hospital had met the requirements for immunity under the HCQIA and
was, therefore, protected from federal antitrust liability. Consequently, the physicians were
also shielded from federal antitrust liability because § 1111 l(a)(1)(D) of the Act protects
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The need for the federal grant of immunity conferred by HCQIA was
tremendous against a Patrick v. Burget backdrop. Physicians for some
time have been reluctant to serve on peer review committees and can-
didly evaluate their peers where there is even slight risk of liability.5 7 By
codifying this unspoken immunity, physicians have become more aware
of the protection available to them, and can rely upon it.5 8 This may be
all the incentive that is needed to encourage quality peer review.
B. The National Practitioner Data Bank
Other criticisms of the HCQIA have to do with the national practi-
tioner data bank. The data bank was supposed to be operational by No-
vember 14, 1987, but the necessary funds could not be generated. Fi-
nally, in June 1988, the House Appropriations Committee approved the
Health and Human Services spending bill for fiscal 1989, and authorized
initiation of the data bank. 9
Originally, the AMA and the Federation of State Medical Boards
(FSMB) submitted bids for the contract to operate the data bank. Each
organization withdrew its bid upon realization that management of the
data bank would require more resources than appeared at first glance.60
UNISYS, an information systems company, was awarded the $15.9 mil-
lion five-year contract, effective January 1, 1990, and given eight months
to organize and implement the program.61
No one can deny the utility of the data bank in its attempt to stop
negligent physicians from practicing medicine. The requirements set out
"any person who participates with, or assists the body with respect to the [professional
review] action." Austin v. McNamara, No. CV 88-04268 RG (C.D. Cal Feb. 20, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
57. Curran, Legal Immunity for Medical Peer Review Programs: New Policies Ex-
plored, 320 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 233, 233 (1989).
58. It has been noted that the true benefit from HCQIA may be a psychological one.
Holthaus, Federal Law Offers Protection for Peer Review, HOSPITALS, July 5, 1988, at 47.
59. HRSA Targeted to Receive $796 Million, THE BLUE SHEET, June 15, 1988, at 3.
60. Koska, Hospitals on Hold for Data Bank Protocols, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1989, at
48. The AMA was willing to operate a clearinghouse for physicians and dentists but did
not feel that it was feasible to include "dozens of diverse licensed health care practitioners,
such as radiologic technologists and dieticians" as the HCQIA requires. National Practi-
tioner Data Bank Proposal Has Become Too Complex, THE BLUE SHEET, August 17,
1988, at 6.
61. Koska, Hospitals on Hold for Data Bank Protocols, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1989, at
48. See also Windom, From the Assistant Secretary for Health, 261 J. A.M.A. 1108, 1108
(1989). Although the data bank will not be operated by the Department of Health and
Human Services, it will be monitored by the Federal Project Officer, a member of HHS'
Office of Quality Assurance. Wilson, New Information Resource, the National Practitioner
Data Bank, 104 PUB. HEALTH REP. 311, 311 (1989).
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in the Data Bank Title IV Regulations not only clarify the provisions of
the Act, but also broaden its scope. The regulations require reporting of
adverse actions by health care entities, licensure actions by state medical
boards, and malpractice payments made by any individual or entity on
behalf of a physician, dentist, or any other health care practioner. 62 With
regard to medical malpractice payments, it is noteworthy that no pre-
sumption of malpractice arises upon payment to settle a claim or
action.63
Many physicians and other health care practitioners felt that the Act,
as originally passed, was a conspiracy against their professional auton-
omy and a violation of procedural due process because they had no con-
trol over the information submitted to the data bank by the licensing
board. To ease these apprehensions, the final regulations require the Sec-
retary to "routinely mail a copy of any report filed in the Data Bank to
the subject individual.""' In order to dispute the accuracy of the reported
information, the individual must notify the Secretary and the reporting
entity, in writing. Until the discrepancy is resolved, reports on further
requests for the same information will indicate its "disputed" status.6
This procedure allows the affected individual an opportunity to "double
check" reported information.
The regulations also place limits on who is able to obtain information
from the data bank. Health care entities and state licensing boards in-
quiring about a particular physician, dentist, or other health care practi-
tioner, and individual physicians, dentists, or other health care practi-
tioners inquiring about themselves, can access the data.66 Access is also
available to those who are not interested in the identification of a specific
health care entity, physician, dentist or other health care practitioner but
want the information for other purposes.67
62. National Practicioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other
Health Care Practicioners, 54 Fed. Reg. 42,730, 42,731-33 (1989) [hereinafter Data Bank
Regs.] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.5, .7-.9). "The Medicare and Medicaid Patient
and Program Protection Act of 1987 (Section 5, Public Law 100-93) expands the bank's
information base to include licensure disciplinary actions taken against all health practi-
tioners and entities, such as hospitals or nursing homes, licensed by a state." Windom,
From the Assistant Secretary for Health, 261 J. A.M.A. 1108, 1108 (1989).
63. Data Bank Regs., supra note 62, at 42,732 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(d)).
64. Id. at 42,734 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(a).
65. Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(b)).
66. Id. at 42,733 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1 l(a)(l)-(4), (6). Malpractice insur-
ance companies cannot access the data bank directly but can require physicians seeking
coverage to provide data bank information as a prerequisite. Hudson & Koska, The Data
Bank: Final Regulations, HOsPiTALs, Dec. 5, 1989, at 35.
67. Data Bank Regs., supra note 62, at 42,733 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
60.11 (a) (7)).
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Many health care professionals were concerned about the degree to
which information in the data bank would be kept confidential. The way
the HCQIA was originally drafted, plaintiffs' attorneys would have had
access to the information in the data bank and peer review records would
no longer be confidential.6 8 Aware of this anxiety, the Regulations de-
cline disclosure to attorneys unless they have filed a claim in state or
federal court against a hospital and a particular practitioner, and it can
be shown that the hospital failed to make its biannual data bank request
of that practitioner. If those requirements are met, the attorney is per-
mitted access to the data on the condition that the information be used
solely in connection with litigation that results from the filing of the
claim or action. 9 The information disclosed by the data bank is strictly
confidential and can be used only for the purposes stated. Violation of
this confidentiality is subject to a maximum $10,000 fine."0
Hospitals who at one time may have favored the Act are already try-
ing to find ways to get around it because it places a large administrative
burden upon them and adds to their expenses since they are responsible
for the costs incurred by the data bank in the processing of the hospital's
requests.7" Although the actual fees for information requests have not
yet been announced, this complaint carries little weight because all esti-
mates by those involved indicate that fees will be in the range of three to
five dollars per request.72 The fees are to be based on actual cost of com-
puter time, photocopying, and postage.73 Admittedly, a large university
hpspital will incur greater costs than a small private hospital when the
68. Law Designed to Protect Peer Review Might Backfire, 12 HosP. PEER REv. 133, 133
(1987).
69. Data Bank Regs., supra note 62, at 42,733 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
60.1 l(a)(5)).
70. Id. at 42,734 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 60.13).
71. The hospitals must report all peer review committee decisions which adversely affect
the clinical privileges of a physician for greater than 30 days to the data bank. To avoid the
necessary compliance with HCQIA and the proposed regulations, it has been said that peer
review committees will dole out 29-, rather than 30-day suspensions. Law Designed to Pro-
tect Peer Review May Backfire, supra note 68, at 135.
72. Hackney, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, in MEDICAL STAFF
AND HOSPITALS: THAT DELICATE RELATIONSHIP 42 (A.B.A. Forum on Health Law, Oct. 5-
6, 1989). Hudson & Koska, supra note 66, at 33. No fee will be assessed a physician
requesting information from the data bank regarding his or her own status. Windom, supra
note 61, at 1108.
73. Data Bank Regs., supra note 62, at 42,733-34 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
60.12(b)). The author is aware that the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 1990 makes a
proposal that would require higlher fees for requests so that the Data Bank could recover its
operating costs, rather than the cost of processing only. If this proposal leads to a marked
increase in access fees, then these higher hospital operating costs will, in the end, be passed
on to the patient. Whether this is the proper party to bear the cost is certainly a debatable
question. 54 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1989).
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biannual request is made, but the price is not too great considering that
the immunity received under the Act will lead to enhanced peer review
and decreased malpractice.
Hospitals are also worried that the Act will create tension between
themselves and the state medical board. The medical board has authority
to report to the Secretary any suspicions they have of a hospital that
never reports malpractice claims or peer review actions. 74 With suspi-
cions raised, the Secretary can conduct an investigation. If the Secretary
finds that the hospital has failed to follow the reporting requirements,
then the hospital will lose its immunity protection for three years.75
Without immunity, there is concern that physicians will conduct peer
review with less vigor or even refuse to participate in peer review alto-
gether.78 To avoid such an inquiry, a hospital will be more aggressive in
evaluating the questionable behavior of its physicians.
VI. STATE PERSPECTIVES ON THE HCQIA
The federal immunity against antitrust actions provided in the
HCQIA applies to all states. There was no immunity for physicians from
state liability actions, however, until October 14, 1989, unless the state
adopted legislation to opt in prior to that date.7 7 If a state did not wish to
be covered by the HCQIA's state immunity protection, then it was re-
quired to specifically opt out of the federal legislation." There is some
debate as to whether the Act preempts state immunity laws, although
most commentators believe that there is no preemption. Nothing in the
Act itself or in the legislative history indicates that preemption of state
immunity -laws was intended. Concerned, however, about a court's inter-
pretation of the Act, some states, believing they had stronger immunities
than given by the HCQIA, considered opting out of the Act's state im-
74. Law Designed to Protect Peer Review Might Backfire, supra note 68, at 135 (1987).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 11111 (b) (Supp. V t987).
76. Holthaus, The Patrick Case: Will it Hinder Peer Review?, HOSPITALS, June 20,
1988, at 56. Note that physicians can only refuse to serve on peer review committees where
it is not mandated by state law. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § IIIII (c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
78. Id. at § I I I I I(c)(2)(B). All states had the option to adopt the HCQIA, or opt out
by the October 1989 deadline. In order to opt out, a state needed to pass legislation that
"waives immunity for peer review from lawsuits brought against them under state law."
HCQIA: CA Doctors Decide to Opt Out, HOSPITALS, July 5, 1988, at 56 (quoting Howard
L. Lang, M.D.).
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munity provision.7 9 California and Maryland were the only states to ac-
tually opt out of the HCQIA.80
Maryland opted out of the HCQIA because it believed that its Medi-
cal Practice Act81 provided greater immunity to its hospitals and health
care practitioners. The state did not want to be intertwined in the appar-
ent confusion surrounding the HCQIA's state law immunities.12 The
state's opt out provision for physicians, dentists, and peer review bodies
became effective on July 1, 1989.83
California opted out of the Act for fear of its possible misinterpreta-
tions and because it believed that it could provide stronger immunities
for its participants in the peer review process.84 Amended Senate Bill
1211, California's second attempt to opt out of the HCQIA, was unani-
mously supported by the Assembly and approved by the governor on
September 8, 1989.85 This statute requires more due process procedures
than the federal legislation, including a more rigorous discovery pro-
cess, 86 a right to engage in voir dire of any panel member or hearing
officer,87 a right to challenge the impartiality of the same,8 a switch of
the burden of proof from the review physician to the peer review board,89
and the use of the preponderance of evidence standard.90 The California
legislature wanted to prevent unjustified accusations that could easily
damage a physician's reputation, and felt that the best means for accom-
plishing this was through explicit and uniform due process procedures.
The federal due process provisions are advisory and are to be used at the
discretion of the hospital governing board,91 but California's SB 1211
79. Hackney, supra note 72, at 30.
80. A state is not permitted to opt out of the reporting requirements of Subchapter II of
the Act.
81. See HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601(d), (f), 14-601.1 (Supp. 1989).
82. Address given by Virginia Hackney, ABA Forum on Health Law (Oct. 5. 1989).
83. MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601.1 (Supp. 1989).
84. Address by Richard Robinson, ABA Forum on Health Law (Oct. 5, 1989). The fear
of misinterpretation lies in the HCQIA's definition of "professional review body" as "a
health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a health care entity which
conducts professional review activity." 42 U.S.C. § 11151(11) (Supp. V 1987). The infer-
ence is that the Act authorizes the hospital governing board to perform peer review, when,
in actuality, the medical staff is the only competent body to make decisions regarding a
fellow physician's professional competence or professional conduct. Opting out based on
this fear was for naught, however, because in the Final Regulations, this definition of pro-
fessional review body was deleted.
85. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809 (West Supp. 1990).
86. Id. § 809.2(d)-(f).
87. Id. at § 809.2(c).
88. Id.
89. Id. at § 809.3(b)(3).
90. Id.
91. See 42 U.S.C. §I11I2(b)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
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requires that the minimum due process procedures set forth in the stat-
ute be incorporated into the bylaws of every hospital in the state.92 There
,are those, however, who believe that the numerous extra procedures in
the statute will increase the longevity of each peer review action, and
physicians, having little spare time, will, therefore, be less willing to
serve on these committees.93 There is a fear among the opponents of the
bill that the proceeding will focus less on the quality of health care and
more on the correct legal procedures. 4
Although the HCQIA has yet to be applied, it appears that Maryland
and California's immunity provisions may not provide as much protec-
tion as the legislatures once thought. A recently decided Maryland case,
Sibley v. Lutheran Hospital,9" granted summary judgment on the physi-
cian's claim of defamation, but allowed the breach of contract claim
against the hospital to go to trial. The hospital was not protected by its
state immunity laws. The state's belief that its statute offered better pro-
tection proved to be incorrect. The result under the HCQIA may have
been the same, but it certainly could not have been worse. 6
VII. ADDITIONAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
Since 1986, more than 100 bills have been passed in forty-four states
which in some way reinforce programs designed to discipline physi-
cians.97 Examples of the new laws include requiring hospitals, doctors,
and nurses to report any suspected unprofessional conduct or charges
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(a)(8) (West Supp. 1990).
93. Am. Med. News, Sept. 16, 1988, at 36, col. 3.
94. Id. The first bill to pass the California Assembly opting out of the immunity provi-
sions of the HCQIA was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian on September 30, 1988. Gover-
nor Deukmejian's reason for vetoing SB 2565 was his concern that it would "take longer
and be more costly for health facilities and peer review bodies to take actions against a
licensee's staff privileges. This means an incompetent licensee [would] be practicing un-
restricted that much longer, and it will be longer before a report is made to the appropriate
licensing boards under [California law]." Am. Med. News, Oct. 21, 1988, at 3, col. 2. In
actuality, this is not the case, as medical staffs would be able to temporarily susijend privi-
leges of those physicians who are pending review. id. at 34, col. 1. Possibly, Deukmejian
was following the advice of the AMA which warned that before opting out, states should
be sure that they have a "carefully tailored" system of immunity. HCQIA: CA Doctors
Decide to Opt Out, supra note 78, at 56.
95. Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp. of Md., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 657 (D. Md. 1989), affd, 871
F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1989).
96. Virginia Hackney, an authority in the area, believes that the HCQIA would have
immunized the hospital from the breach of contract claim and furthered the intent of the
Act: protection from liability in damage suits leading to more candid peer review. Hack-
ney, supra note 72, at 11-12 n.36.
97. Wiebe, Bad Medicine, THE NEW PHYSICIAN, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 26 (citing to the
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project in Washington, D.C.).
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brought against physicians, and strengthening the licensing board's rules
regarding physician discipline.98
In Texas, the state licensing board was given more investigatory power
and must investigate any physician who has been sued three times in the
last five years. The board can proceed against any physician convicted of
criminal conduct before the appeals process has been completed, and is
required to publicize any adverse actions taken against a physician. 99
The state of Oregon has developed an original program which the
state director of medical/legal affairs for the Oregon Medical Associa-
tion hopes will be instituted throughout the country.1"' After the Patrick
case, the Oregon Medical Association initiated a peer review system that
works through the board of medical examiners (BME). When there is
agreement among the physician being reviewed, the medical staff, and
the hospital governing board that outside peer review is "in everyone's
best interest," then they can request the board of medical examiners to
assign an impartial group of physicians to conduct the peer review. 1
The BME is not given any of the details, thus the proceeding against the
physician is kept confidential unless it is determined that disciplinary ac-
tion will occur. The reviewing board is still obligated to follow that par-
ticular hospital's bylaws. If the reviewing board determines that discipli-
nary action is warranted, then to insure against accusations of antitrust
violations, the BME must provide another group of physicians "to sit as
finders of fact." 102 When a hearing is necessary, the BME can appoint
an attorney as a hearing officer to conduct a "due process" hearing in
compliance with the hospital's bylaws.1 13 The second group of physicians,
who were the finders of fact, give their conclusions to the hospital gov-
erning board, which then determines whether disciplinary action is actu-
ally necessary. At this time, the BME is notified of the governing board's
action and given the details of the case.104
Oregon has also implemented a Risk Assessment and Management
Program (RAMP) which is intended to avoid formal legal action alto-
gether. "RAMP provides an alternative to litigation in situations in
which the medical staff [believe] they need to take action on an individ-
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Paul R. Frisch, director of medical/legal affairs for the Oregon Medical Associa-
tion indicated that their program is unique to Oregon, but that he would like to see it
implemented nationwide. Strive to Augment Protections for Peer Review Activities, 13
Hosp. PEER REV. 93, 94 (1988).
101. New Statutes May Avert Huge Awards Against Peer Reviewers, 13 Hosp. PEER
REV. 65, 65 (1988).
102. Id. at 66.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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ual's practice, but the physician doesn't think he or she can get a fair
shake within the hospital."' 10 5 Any hospital entity, medical staff, peer re-
view committee, or even an individual physician can request the medical
association to do a risk assessment of a physician on the staff, or the
requesting physician."0 6 The association sends physician experts to evalu-
ate a doctor's practice, behavior, and malpractice claims. 0 7 Following
the evaluation, the experts draft a contract which delineates the ways in
which the physician's behavior and practice may be modified so as to
reduce malpractice exposure.'0 8 The physician must agree to follow the
requirements and sign the contract.'09 There has been a positive response
to the program from hospital medical staffs and insurance carriers. As
one commentator noted, the contracts convince them "that the specific
criteria for success have been spelled out, that there is an educational
program to help the physician achieve success, and that there is ongoing
monitoring of the physician's activities."'" 0
The state of Washington has also done something original. There was
fear that under the federal legislation, peer review committees may have
been given too much immunity. The state found it "necessary to balance
carefully the rights of the consuming public who benefit by peer review
with those who are occasionally hurt by peer review decisions." When
peer review is conducted on a basis other than professional competence,
as in the Patrick case, then it is not conducted in good faith and the
falsely accused physician is entitled to damages. The state statute pro-
vides for an "exclusive remedy" of "damages only for lost earnings di-
rectly attributable to the ction taken by the professional review body
[and] incurred between the date of such action and the date the action is
functionally reversed."' " 2
A new proposal in New York would require administering a test to
each physician before recertification to determine if they still meet the
medical standards. Currently, in order to be recertified, physicians need
only return a form to the state government. 13 It is doubtful that this
program will ever be implemented due to the costs involved to catch a
105. Id. at 67 (quoting Paul R. Frisch).
106. Id. at 67.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 67-68.
112. Id. at 68. The purpose is to give a physician like Dr. Patrick an adequate remedy,
"but not a goofy remedy," of $2.3 million. Id.
113. Wiebe, supra note 97, at 26.
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small percentage of malpracticing physicians, but it is encouraging to see
that steps are being taken.' 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
A jury award exceeding two million dollars to a physician who sued
members of a medical peer review board shocked the medical commu-
nity. Many physicians stopped serving as volunteers on the peer review
committees; others, never having served, vowed never to do so. The reluc-
tance of physicians to serve on peer evaluation committees is a serious
problem. Like it or not, physicians are the only ones who have the exper-
tise to know whether or not a fellow physician has committed medical
malpractice. Peer review works as a policing system, separating the com-
petent physicians from the incompetent. Without it, few malpracticing
physicians will be sanctioned appropriately.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 augments the
peer review system in two ways. First, it grants federal antitrust immu-
nity to those physicians who conduct peer review. Second, the Act cre-
ates a national practitioner data bank for the accumulation of informa-
tion regarding actions taken or sanctions imposed upon physicians, thus
impeding the ability of these malpracticing physicians to transfer from
state to state.
Ironically enough, the catalyst behind the Act, the case of Patrick v.
Burget, could still occur despite the HCQIA. The outcome in the Patrick
case was the result of peer review conducted specifically to drive Dr.
Patrick out of business and out of town. If the same type of review were
to happen today with the same motives, it would be in contravention of
the Act's requirement that review be conducted in the furtherance of
quality health care, and thus, there would be no immunity offered to the
member of the reviewing organization.
Prior to the Act, if a peer review action was conducted in good faith,
and without signs of anticompetitiveness, then an antitrust suit would not
survive. The same holds true after the enactment of HCQIA. Disregard-
ing peer evaluation conducted in bad faith, legislation was needed to as-
sure medical staff personnel that they were protected from federal liabil-
ity when fulfilling their ethical obligations. The HCQIA fills that niche.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act is not the only safeguard
needed to entice physicians to voluntarily serve on peer review commit-
tees. In order to fill in the missing spaces, experts recommend that peer
review committee members do the following:
114. Id.
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(1) Develop alternatives to litigation.
(2) Lobby state legislators to expand protections and limit damages
for peer review activities.
(3) Insist on indemnification for peer review responsibilities.
(4) Call in external peer reviewers to assist with difficult cases.
(5) Push Congress to augment protection under the [HCQIA]. 115
As far as developing alternatives to litigation, there are those who ar-
gue that neither a hearing nor an attorney is proper in the peer review
evaluation process. Dr. Patrick's attorney thinks that a hearing before an
arbitrator is a good idea and ensures the fairness of the proceeding. He
believes that "[i]f there's reason to believe there's a rivalry between par-
ticipants, they should get a neutral and impartial person to decide."' 16
The Act can also be seen as a method of alternative dispute resolution
when one considers the potential advantages of a national practitioner
data bank. The hospitals are already complaining about the extra admin-
istrative costs associated with the reporting requirements, but the bene-
fits to be reaped are enormous. With effective peer review boards no
longer under the threat of federal antitrust litigation, and with provisions
in the Act requiring all hospitals to run a status check on all of their
staff, current and incoming, the malpracticing physician might well be-
come an extinct entity, or at least an endangered species. With a de-
creased number of malpracticing physicians, the number of harmful er-
rors will be reduced, thereby abating the need for medical malpractice
lawsuits. The less time and attention health care practitioners spend on
litigation, the more time and attention they can spend with patients. As
a result, patients will receive better care, feel more satisfaction in the
care they receive, and therefore, be less inclined to seek redress in a
court of law against a health care entity or practitioner. The Health
Care Quality Improvement Act's attempt to improve the peer review
process goes a long way toward furthering these goals.
Lynda M. Leedy
115. Strive to Augment Protections for Peer Review Activities, supra note 100, at 93.
116. Holthaus, supra note 10, at 56.

